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TS 000233

SUBJECT:

Evaluation of the Next Actions by the USER

in Bespect to the Ouban Situation

TO:

Director, Plans and Policy The Joint Staff

THE GATHE DESILE

1. Reference J-5 M 806-62.

2. In keeping with the explanatory remarks by General Turnage regarding the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stamming from the Present Cuban Situation," has been prepared.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Atch
MA Analysis Cuben Situation (75)
(Cys. 1; 2; 3 & *) (cys. 9 only)

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SOFTER ACCOUNT MEMBERS FACE THE PRESENT CHARLESTERN

The present Orban situation" is have taken to means no further build-up of offensive missiles or sironoft; an impending discontinuent of such missiles already in Orba; no further stops toward hostilities.

Fundamentally, Soviet setions, particularly military estions, in the encuing souths will be guided by cold, uncentional consideration of the factors establishing the overall belance of forces in the world.

Foremost in this process will be the fortst sementant of UK willingness to content, by any means necessary, a Soriet willteny move against any area to which the UK has consisted itself.

Also importantly influencing Soviet decicions will be their assessment of the high state of vigor and solicarity in the Vestern alliance systems.

The WESE will also be conscious of the charged stiltudes of the leading "mentrel" mation, India, and the effect of the investor by China on the Communist appropriate seell as on the rest of the newtrals and the world at large.

A final factor influencing Soviet behavior in the most six contas or so will be the danger of challenging the UE twice and again allowing the UE to have the industribution a time of resolute predisposition. Again, the retains to Soviet prestign and sinus equid result editor in drestic loss of Soviet prestign and influence or, and perhaps also, the need to revitalize the Soviet image by measures beyond that level where the US response might be controlled or influenced.

Thus, while Soviet military capabilities remain impressive, it expense that now, more than ever in the recent part, if the USSE is to challenge the US it will more likely challenge as in a military manner on only these issues which the Sovieta believe the US is willing to lose. Given this point of deperture, issues which the USBE might exploit as an extensible response to the Ochem affair do not suggest theseeless.

On the whole, Berlin to Lens likely to be subjected to howist military passesses than if Caba had not begressed. It seems unlikely that the Sevists feed any real need simply to test US resolve or imbentions those. An outright military conflict probably supposes ill-advised — because of the risk of general war and because the local action could be frustrated with attendent further dumps to the Seviet image. Produce and Communist distants against Perlin to be delayed until, at a minimum, it can be completely disassociated from Caba.

Military action in Asia some quite possible in view of Sino-Soviet canabilities. Such action would however, be hard to relate to Cobe. The one area that succests itself as a "response" to Othe is the Taiwen Straits area. Here again, there is no much to test US resolve and even greater denser of local military defeat. Other areas are not so francht with danger, but other considerations operate to make the likelihood of action more dependent on local issues rather then on Orde. Foremost enoug these restraining considerations are the Sino-Soviet disguise and Soviet concern lest China also fail or become shie to inscire the WESE beyond its own desires. The Indian border investor has had and will have far-reaching implications for Asian and Morad attitudes toward Uning and toward Communism. It equid prove to be enduringly emberressing, if, as seems likely. Indian remistance is sufficient to the task. It is also possib . that a new, Western-oriented defence alignment will emerge across South Asia, particularly on the sub-continent.

Thus, military actions which were, or could be construed to be, related to Cuba are probably viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to Cuba, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues 400, in the main, are not indicated.

Hilitary actions which might be undertaken without undue risks and which might contribute, or be made to contribute, to

the refurtishing of the Soviet image, would be demonstrative acts in the fields of waspens and delivery systems development. Suchear testing seems, in view of the recent past, to be less promising them developments in the general field of missiles, space vehicles and missile defence. Dramatic demonstrations could prove valuable — probably more so if accompanied by moderate statements of Soviet power and "forebessence under provocation."

On the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Cuban affeir is a call for renewed (and possibly truly seemingful) discussions to reduce tensions and the espaintles of the major powers to bring about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Western alliances; to underscore the rew fact of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, thus, parhaps, to play upon and exploit national sensitivities of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diminution of US effectiveness; at a maximum, it could induce the West to rewert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of comparatively minor issues.

None of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will coase to be Communists — bent on world domination. Eather, it seeks to convey the view that the Soviet leadership is emlikely to probe or confront the Kest militarily in the next six months.

Caba, however, constitutes quite a problem in itself beyond this time period. The US Merel bese at Countempre will probably continue under heavy pressure, in a diplometic sense, once the current crisis has absted. In this case, however, the USER is more likely to play a secondary — though critical role. Cute, itself, with or without Castro, will be portrayed as the sole instigator, with the USER supporting its claims to "movumeignty" and the right to expel foreign military powers. In this connection, the success of the US in removing the effective missiles would be cited as particl "justification" for Chim's thesis.

Horeover, it is quite possible that, again after "risis abstament, the USSE would continue, if not expend, its development of defensive military strength in Cuba. This could be done either so a static pressure tehind moves toward detente and selected areas of area central, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Latin America.

TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW

TS 000233

Evaluation of the Next Actions by the USSR in Respect to the Cuban Situation SUBJECT:

TO: Director, Plans and Policy

The Joint Staff

1. Reference: J-5 M806-62

2. In keeping with the explanatory remarks by General Turnage regarding the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stemming from the Present Cuban Situation," has been prepared.

SOVIET ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE PRESENT CUBAN SITUATION

The "present Cuban situation" is here taken to mean: no further buildup of offensive missiles or aircraft; an impending dismantlement of such missiles already in Cuba; no further steps toward hostilities.

Fundamentally, Soviet actions, particularly military actions in the ensuing months will be guided by cold, unemotional consideration of the factors establishing the overall balance of forces in the world.

Foremost in this process will be the Soviet assessment of US willingness to contest, by any means necessary, a Soviet military move against any area to which the US has committed itself.

Also importantly influencing Soviet decisions will be their assessment of the high state of vigor and solidarity in the Western alliance systems.

The USSR will also be conscious of the changed attitudes of the leading "neutral" nation, India, and the effect of its invasion by China on the Communist movement as well as on the rest of the neutrals and the world at large.

A final factor influencing Soviet behavior in the next six months or so will be the danger of challenging the US twice and again allowing the US to have the initiative in a time of

resolute predisposition. Again, two rebuffs to Soviet pretensions could result either in drastic loss of Soviet prestige and influence or, and perhaps also, the need to revitalize the Soviet image by measures beyond that level where the US response might be controlled or influenced.

Thus, while Soviet military capabilities remain impressive, it appears that now, more than ever in the recent past, if the USSR is to challenge the US it will more likely challenge us in a military manner on only those issues which the Soviets believe the US is willing to lose. Given this point of departure, issues which the USSR might exploit as an ostensible response to the Cuban affair do not suggest themselves.

On the whole, Berlin is less likely to be subjected to Soviet military pressures than if Cuba had not happened. It seems unlikely that the Soviets feel any real need simply to test US resolve or intentions there. An outright military conflict probably appears ill-advised -- because of the risk of general war and because the local action could be frustrated with attendant further damage to the Soviet image. Prudence and Communist dictates against "reckless adventurism" will probably cause action against Berlin to be delayed until, at a minimum, it can be completely disassociated from Cuba.

Military action in Asia seems quite possible in view of Sino-Soviet capabilities. Such action would, however, be hard to relate to Cuba. The one area that suggests itself as a "response" to Cuba is the Taiwan Straits area. Here again, there is no need to test US resolve and even greater danger of local military defeat. Other areas are not so fraught with danger, but other considerations operate to make the likelihood of action more development on local issues rather than on Cuba. Foremost among these restraining considerations are the Sino-Soviet dispute and Soviet concern lest China also fail or become able to involve the USSR beyond its own desires. The Indian worder invasion has had and will have far-reaching implications for Asian and World attitudes toward China and toward Communism. It could prove to be enduringly embarrassing, if, as seems likely, Indian resistance is sufficient to the task. It is also possible that a new. Western-oriented defense alignment will emerge South Asia, particularly on the sub-continent.

Thus, military actions which were, or could be construed to be, related to Cuba are probably viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to Cuba, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues and, in the main, are not indicated.

Military actions which might be undertaken without due risks and which might contribute, or be made to contribute, to

the refurbishing of the Soviet image, would be demonstrative acts in the fields of weapons and delivery systems development. Nuclear testing seems, in view of the recent past, to be less promising than developments in the general field of missiles, space vehicles and missile defence. Dramatic demonstrations could prove valuable -- probably more so if accompanied by moderate statements of Soviet power and "forbearance under provocation."

on the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Cuban affair is a call for renewed (and possibly truly meaningful) discussions to reduce tensions and the capacities of the major powers to bring about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Western alliances; to underscore the raw fact of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, thus, perhaps, to play upon and exploit national sensitivities of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diminution of US effectiveness; at a maximum, it could induce the West to revert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of comparatively minor issues.

None of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will cease to be Communists — 'ent on world domination. Rather, it seeks to convey the view that the Soviet leadership is unlikely to probe or confront the West militarily in the next six months.

Cuba, however, constitutes quite a problem in itself beyond this time period. The US Naval base at Guantanamo will probably continue under heavy pressure, in a diplomatic sense, once the current crisis has abated. In this case, however, the USSR is more likely to play a secondary -- though critical role. Cuba, itself, with or without Castro, will be portrayed as the sole instigator, with the USSR supporting its claims to "sovereignty" and the right to expel foreign military powers. In this connection, the success of the US in removing the offensive missiles would be cited as partial "justification" for Cuba's thesis.

Moreover, it is quite possible that, again after crisis abatement, the USSR would continue, if not expand, its development of defensive military strength in Cuba. This could be done either as a static pressure behind moves toward detente and selected areas of arms control, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Latin America.